I received a notice yesterday announcing the premier of "Inside the Vietnam War" on the National Geographic Channel onMonday, February 18 at 8 PM EST. The program is three hours long.
Maybe I should just trust the proponents of this program but I have seen too many Vietnam retrospectives that simply p---- me off. In everything I have seen as time has passed there seems to be a need by these "historians" to give the vast number of non-veteran, baby-boomers who protested, evaded the draft or simply enjoyed the good life at home a "feel-good" sense of approval. Their protest, evasion or indifference has become an essential part of these productions because Vietnam was the "wrong war" or because of the My Lai atrocities or tales of fabrications of body counts or whatever. The narrations always point to the "big picture." The in-country portion invariably shows the same napalm run over a seemingly peaceful village, the naked child running from conflict and the early stages of the Tet Offensive. Of course, there are the interviews with troops who suffer from PTSD. My view or the conclusions of others on the "big picture" or the politics are not relevant to my views here.
It seems that it has taken 60 years to present, truthfully and dramatically, the bravery, integrity and selflessness during combat of the World War II grunts. A visitor to the magazine section at any bookstore will find multiple shelves reporting the battles and heroics of the Civil War and World War II. You may find a bi-monthly magazine on Vietnam. Maybe it will take a like period of time for the retrospectives or documentaries or motion pictures to pick up on the fact that the men, draftees or volunteers, who fought in the jungles of Vietnam have their own singular, monumental story. Those who fought all know some of those stories and those of the nurses and doctors, of those on the rivers and off the coast, of the chopper pilots and gunners, of the close air support, et al. The only venue for these stories now seems to be the scattered, almost anonymous, Internet web sites sought out primarily by other veterans.
The men and women now fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq are now rightfully the focus of the public's interest. And there have been some good productions from Iraq on television. Even now, however, the fickle great-American-public seems to be losing interest in these combat experiences. "Hamburger Hill," like "Pork Chop Hill" before it, presented some of the best qualities of the veteran in combat. That snapshot is overwhelmed, however, by these supposedly historical documentaries. The bottom line for me is until the bravery, integrity and selflessness of the men and women who fought and died in Vietnam is made the singular thesis of a documentary I don't care to watch another supposedly "balanced" history.
Showing posts with label Vietnam. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Vietnam. Show all posts
Wednesday, February 06, 2008
Saturday, January 05, 2008
A letter to a classmate.
With all due respect, now, more than ever, is the time for such discussions. Your comment suggests that there had been an earlier conversation [about the Iraq War] among the class. I regret that I missed that opportunity. I believe that the conversation should have never ended. Our country is in an approach to a general election. Notwithstanding the cherry-picked issues of the candidates and the media during the primaries, the fundamental concern must be the character, competence and qualification of those who would be our elected leaders. The decisions of this present administration over the course of the past seven years now form the framework of what we as a nation have become and, to a great measure, define the position we maintain in each “crisis” situation around the world. Now is precisely the time, for example, to educate ourselves and discuss the events and actors that pulled us out of Afghanistan and put us into Iraq. Now is the time to discuss the competence, character and policies of the current administration and to apply those negative or positive lessons and value-judgments in our evaluation of which direction our country should now move.
I suggest that is it our duty, a duty greater than most other Americans, to the men and women now serving and who will serve over the next generation, to continue to educate ourselves and others about the leadership lessons of the Iraq war. One of my concerns has been that we as a nation will now blindly accept the status quo and not call to account the decisions and “deciders” that brought us to this point in Iraq. It is far too easy just to say “We are in Iraq so we need to support the troops.” I fully support the magnificent effort of the men and women serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. We cannot pullout precipitously. However, the fact that this effort is finally being applied in a tactically sound, counter-insurgent manner with increasing success, should not, must not, cause us to ignore the nature and conduct of the leaders who brought us to this moment. These lessons should control the present, presidential political debate. Who knows, there may even be time to discuss the use of torture, Middle-East policy, the Fourth Amendment to the Bill of Rights, Habeas Corpus or even why the Army forgot the lessons our men died teaching us in Vietnam. Having graduated in the bottom five percent of our class I have always admired the intelligence of my classmates [including those few whose names are found after my own]. With the experience and education gained since June 1965 I think we might just have something to contribute.
I suggest that is it our duty, a duty greater than most other Americans, to the men and women now serving and who will serve over the next generation, to continue to educate ourselves and others about the leadership lessons of the Iraq war. One of my concerns has been that we as a nation will now blindly accept the status quo and not call to account the decisions and “deciders” that brought us to this point in Iraq. It is far too easy just to say “We are in Iraq so we need to support the troops.” I fully support the magnificent effort of the men and women serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. We cannot pullout precipitously. However, the fact that this effort is finally being applied in a tactically sound, counter-insurgent manner with increasing success, should not, must not, cause us to ignore the nature and conduct of the leaders who brought us to this moment. These lessons should control the present, presidential political debate. Who knows, there may even be time to discuss the use of torture, Middle-East policy, the Fourth Amendment to the Bill of Rights, Habeas Corpus or even why the Army forgot the lessons our men died teaching us in Vietnam. Having graduated in the bottom five percent of our class I have always admired the intelligence of my classmates [including those few whose names are found after my own]. With the experience and education gained since June 1965 I think we might just have something to contribute.
Saturday, May 12, 2007
Recollections of the Battle of Soui Tre, Vietnam on March 21, 1967
"One of the war's greatest victories." VFW Magazine.
I had been the Recon platoon leader in the 2nd Battalion, 22d Infantry (Mechanized), a.k.a. "Triple Deuce"(radio call sign: “Fullback”), for a couple of months prior to March 21st, 1967. The following recollections are sketchy in part but also with specific, very vivid memories interspersed. The battalion was operating as part of Operation Junction City and Fire Support Base Gold was established at a hot LZ near Soui Tre (a dot on the map only). The full 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry secured the perimeter at Gold for the 2d Battalion of the 77th Artillery (DS). Prior to March 21st our battalion had been involved in S&D (Search & Destroy) operations in assigned areas mainly to the west of Soui Tre.
On the night of the 20th of March, my battalion commander, LTC Ralph Julian, assigned Charlie company, commanded by Cpt George C. White, an area of operations with alert notice of possible need to reinforce FSB Gold. My Recon platoon was attached to Charlie company for more fire power. Charlie company had been and continued, through at least January 1968 when it fought decisively at FSB Burt (Soui Cut - another dot on the map)[1], to be the most aggressive and competent of the line companies.[2] I was not happy with the attachment of my platoon to a line company, even Charlie company. Recon had operated continuously and successfully as a separate maneuver unit. The men in the platoon firmly told me of their dissatisfaction with the attachment that night as well. Insult seemed to be heaped onto insult when White directed me to bring the Recon platoon up the rear of his company. My platoon had been having sustained VC contact prior to the 20th of March and possibly White wanted to give us a break. Whatever the reason, it did not sit very well with me though I did not say anything to White whom I greatly respected. Recon had always been out front and in the thick of it and as it turned out on March 21st the “insults” would put us right back at the front and in the heat of battle.
Charlie moved out and we pulled in behind. We had not moved for very long when George White called me[3] and advised that he had been ordered to immediately move to reinforce the units at FSB Gold. He directed us to turn the individual tracks in-place and Recon was to be the lead unit in Fullback’s reinforcement effort. I have to say that there was, in fact, a small smile on my face and shouts on the platoon radio of “Yes!” and “Let’s get em!”. When it came to moving the M113 tracks, Recon drivers were outstanding and we spun and began to move. Soon after we had all turned 180 degrees and I had moved to the new front of the column as the third track we started off. Looking off to my left I saw an RPG round in the air heading toward us but striking a large termite hill about 30 yards from our line. I doubt that any one else saw it due to our positions. There was no other VC contact so I chose not to engage the enemy there given the immediacy of our need to get to FSB Gold. At the time I considered it a deliberate effort to engage and stall all or some of us. As we moved through the thick jungle, the drivers ( I wish that I could recall the lead driver’s name!) did a superb job. Other units including elements of the 2d Battalion of the 34th Armor and the 2d Battalion of the 12th Infantry (leg infantry) were also moving toward Gold to reinforce. Given the speed of our movement literally “over” the trees and jungle and our unfamiliarity of the situation at Gold my platoon was detached from Charlie and I again had direct radio contact with our battalion CO, LTC Ralph Julian. Julian was in a bubble top helicopter at tree top level drawing fire and directing our column through the jungle into Soui Tre. Along the way we encountered tanks of the 2d/34th Armor that had been moving to the battle but had thrown tracks and couldn’t effectively move through the jungle. Recon followed by Charlie passed them by but they joined in behind us through the paths we had cleared. Our tracks broke enough jungle for the tanks to join further back in the column. I recall crossing no major water obstacle but then again my focus was on getting to Soui Tre in a hurry.[4] As we moved I began to get and passed on updates on the battle at FSB Gold that finally included reports of several breaches of the perimeter and hand to hand fighting within. The Artillery had lowered their guns to fire directly into the enemy waves. One round had to be fired to destroy one of their own "quad 50's" that the VC had overrun and were attempting to turn against the Americans. My drivers broke through thick jungle and overcame obstacles with ever increasing determination as they heard the reports. During the movement, due to the superb skills of the drivers and the sergeants directing them we did not throw a single track on any of the M113's - a relatively easy mishap in M113 maneuvers through the jungle
Eventually we broke through into a large open area at Soui Tre and I could see the smoke ahead from the battle centered to our northeast about 600 meters to our front. At this point I asked LTC Julian for guidance as to how to deploy most effectively . He said that he was not certain of the immediate need and that I should contact the commanders on the ground at the firebase. As our tracks broke into the clearing and moved toward the firebase and after I had spoken to Julian I recall seeing bodies on the ground in front of our tracks. Impulsively I had the thought to call the platoon and warn them to be careful and not run anyone over (too many days as a safety officer in the States I guess). Almost as instantaneously, and fortunately before I gave the command, it hit me that the prone figures in the open grass were the enemy and they were shooting at us. My perception was that the events began to move more slowly but in reality things were happening very quickly from that point on.
Our movement to the FSB once we had broken out into the clearing was direct and in a single column, Recon, Charlie Co., 2/34 Armor. I brought the lead track right to the edge of the 3d/22nd perimeter and they angled out facing the attack. The defensive position was smoldering. It gave an appearance of having been flattened and what had been, I am sure, a circular defensive position was clearly broken at several points. I was in the third track and as my track came to the edge of the defensive perimeter I could see and immediately recognized two LTC’s moving toward me on the ground in front of me with smiles from ear to ear.[5] I had jumped up to the top of the track in case I had needed to get on the ground to coordinate. Their smiles and proximity kept me on top of the track, a location that, in retrospect, was, at the least, ill-advised. There were an awful lot of bullets whizzing past. I yelled down “Which way should we go?” “”Anyway you want!” came the replies through the smiles. At this point I got on the radio and looked back behind me. Stretching all the way back into the jungle break out point was an awesome single file of M113's and tanks. The sound of the engines almost seemed to overcome the battle sounds. It must have been a truly frightening site and sound to the enemy. At that point I wish that I had thought to say something significant; possibly a “Sound the charge!” or a “YOOOO!” reminiscent of a John Wayne movie sound bite or a “Follow me!” of Fort Benning origin. “Move out. Circle the perimeter” with an arm wave was, however, what came out. I recall then LTC Vessey quoted in the news about our arrival saying the event was just like the cavalry charge to the rescue of the wagon train from a John Wayne movie.
The move around the perimeter was eventful. VC at times prone on the ground began running, many toward and some away from us. Some tried to climb onto our tracks as we moved between the firebase and the main VC attack. The 50 caliber machine guns tore into the VC unit but pistols and M-16s kept the VC off the tracks. Sgt Casablanca, my platoon sergeant had been manning one of the turret 50s. His 50 malfunctioned as we arrived and he ended up expending several hundred rounds by hand pumping each individual round into the chamber - an extraordinary physical effort. When the battle ended there were VC bodies every few feet. The total official body count of VC was 647. I understand that this was the single largest enemy body count of the war. Bulldozers were lifted in and the bodies dumped into huge mass graves they created. Thirty-one Americans were killed and 187 wounded.
After it had settled, I took my platoon on a dismounted sweep of the battlefield as helicopters brought in supplies and evacuated our dead and wounded. I was called over to one of the VC bodies by one of my men who believed the VC was still alive. The VC was face down prone on the ground with each hand tucked under his chest. We moved the body by pulling the leg with the use of a pack harness thinking it was booby trapped or that he was still armed. As we did this he began to turn around toward us. A couple of men jumped on him and after a brief struggle, and no unnecessary harm to him, we secured him. I found out later that he was an officer who provided good intelligence.
During the heat of the 3d/22d’s battle, the Air Force and Army artillery had expended a lot of ordnance against the VC attack. The Air Force missions had been directed from a small single-engine prop aircraft by an Air Force fighter pilot serving as a forward air controller (FAC) while another piloted the aircraft. I had known the FAC very well from our time in Ft. Lewis prior to deployment. About a month prior he had swooped down over my position out in the jungle and dropped me a pair of Air Force pilot gloves that I still have. When he was killed he had three more days before he was to leave his FAC responsibilities and go back to flying fighters in-country. Their plane had been shot down during the battle and after things had settled down at the FSB a chopper pilot flying over saw movement at the crash site some distance from the firebase. We believed that the bulk of the withdrawing VC force, the better part of a division, had retreated into or through this area.
LTC Julian ordered my platoon to move rapidly to the location to see if it had been survivors or VC that had been seen at the site. As we approached the crash site we drew fire from our front and flank and then at the site. A platoon from Bravo 2d/22nd was moved into position to reinforce (or save us) if necessary. I ended up not calling them forward and secured the site. We recovered the bodies of both pilots from the wreckage and brought them back. Soon after we had extracted them (given the enemy contact and threat, we all moved very quickly) the aircraft exploded sending me flying about 20 feet. Our movements, I assume, might have put some still hot electrical wires in contact with the gasoline. Of course in-coming fire might have triggered the explosion but we didn’t stick around to investigate.
Well that’s about it. I understand that the battlefield is now under Suoi Tre Lake with the recent damming of a river. Regrettably, I haven’t sat down with another FSB Gold veteran in a very long time. These are old memories now and others can fill in a different perspective or recollection or maybe refresh mine. On that day as on each day of my time in Vietnam I was most privileged to command and serve with the finest men I will ever know. God bless them.
Nine months later on the night of January 1 - 2, 1968 , the Triple Deuce again with the 3d/22 Infantry, and the 2d/77Artillery were involved in a second massive attack by four battalions of NVA and VC at a place called Soui Cut. Soui Cut was just another dot on the map some 8 or 9 klicks northeast of Soui Tre. It was called Fire Support Base Burt in Vietnam. This time Triple Deuce was securing part of the perimeter. When the firing stopped the next morning, over 401 NVA and VC were dead on the battlefield with American losses at 23 killed and 153 wounded. I understand that one of the participants later wrote a screen play and produced the movie "Platoon" loosely presenting the Soui Cut battle as the culminating encounter in the movie.
[1] I certainly do not mean to diminish its contributions and accomplishments right up to the present day. I just don’t know what actions it has engaged in since that date.
[2] In the spirit of full disclosure, I commanded Charlie company for the six months following White. “Chargin Chuck” was an awesome fighting machine. Let me add now that the men, enlisted and non-commissioned infantry, medics, mechanics, drivers and mortars in our whole battalion, in the line companies, Recon and headquarters company were individually and collectively outstanding. Officer leadership varied.
[3] While we had operated as a separate maneuver unit I had direct radio with the battalion commander. Attached to Charlie I had to drop that line to operate on the Charlie Company net - another “insult”.
[4] In subsequent press reports COL Garth, the Brigade CO, was quoted as saying that he had directed that we turn tracks over in the river and cross over them if necessary to breach the river obstacle. Some of the recent accounts suggest that the incident happened, though possibly with some other unit. While I commanded the lead unit I was never given such a directive nor was such a directive, in my memory, ever brought up or discussed in the aftermath of the battle among the participants. During our movement to and entry into Gold, LTC Julian in his bubble top was the only unit commander I saw flying below a 2-3 thousand foot altitude and drawing fire. He flew at tree top level.
[5] One of these LTC’s was the artillery battalion commander at Gold named Vessey. He later in his career became the Chief of Staff of the Army.
For further information try http://www.22ndinfantry.org/vietnam.htm. There are a number of other websites of units who were part of these battles that are worth looking at. As examples: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,941071,00.html http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/Vietnam/90-7/ch13.htm
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The original note was posted on 5/12/07. This is just a brief update to my original note. Recently, I met with LTC Julian (now Col [ret.]) for the first time since 1967 and we spoke about the Soui Tre battle. He informed me that subsequent to my platoon's extraction of the Air Force pilots, another of our units had swept through the area. They found that my platoon, on our way to recover the pilots, had actually driven over and close to a half a dozen buried artillery rounds that had been wired by the VC to command detonate. Apparently the VC had planned their escape route expecting our mechanized unit to chase them and laid the IED's for us. We didn't use the IED term back then although the VC consistently and effectively used "improvised" claymores in the trees and booby traps in the defense of their jungle base camps and buried artillery rounds in the roadways and expected travel routes. The speed of our movement and the effectiveness of our return fire, somehow, kept them from setting off the explosives following Soui Tre.
Grappa, July 31, 2009.
I had been the Recon platoon leader in the 2nd Battalion, 22d Infantry (Mechanized), a.k.a. "Triple Deuce"(radio call sign: “Fullback”), for a couple of months prior to March 21st, 1967. The following recollections are sketchy in part but also with specific, very vivid memories interspersed. The battalion was operating as part of Operation Junction City and Fire Support Base Gold was established at a hot LZ near Soui Tre (a dot on the map only). The full 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry secured the perimeter at Gold for the 2d Battalion of the 77th Artillery (DS). Prior to March 21st our battalion had been involved in S&D (Search & Destroy) operations in assigned areas mainly to the west of Soui Tre.
On the night of the 20th of March, my battalion commander, LTC Ralph Julian, assigned Charlie company, commanded by Cpt George C. White, an area of operations with alert notice of possible need to reinforce FSB Gold. My Recon platoon was attached to Charlie company for more fire power. Charlie company had been and continued, through at least January 1968 when it fought decisively at FSB Burt (Soui Cut - another dot on the map)[1], to be the most aggressive and competent of the line companies.[2] I was not happy with the attachment of my platoon to a line company, even Charlie company. Recon had operated continuously and successfully as a separate maneuver unit. The men in the platoon firmly told me of their dissatisfaction with the attachment that night as well. Insult seemed to be heaped onto insult when White directed me to bring the Recon platoon up the rear of his company. My platoon had been having sustained VC contact prior to the 20th of March and possibly White wanted to give us a break. Whatever the reason, it did not sit very well with me though I did not say anything to White whom I greatly respected. Recon had always been out front and in the thick of it and as it turned out on March 21st the “insults” would put us right back at the front and in the heat of battle.
Charlie moved out and we pulled in behind. We had not moved for very long when George White called me[3] and advised that he had been ordered to immediately move to reinforce the units at FSB Gold. He directed us to turn the individual tracks in-place and Recon was to be the lead unit in Fullback’s reinforcement effort. I have to say that there was, in fact, a small smile on my face and shouts on the platoon radio of “Yes!” and “Let’s get em!”. When it came to moving the M113 tracks, Recon drivers were outstanding and we spun and began to move. Soon after we had all turned 180 degrees and I had moved to the new front of the column as the third track we started off. Looking off to my left I saw an RPG round in the air heading toward us but striking a large termite hill about 30 yards from our line. I doubt that any one else saw it due to our positions. There was no other VC contact so I chose not to engage the enemy there given the immediacy of our need to get to FSB Gold. At the time I considered it a deliberate effort to engage and stall all or some of us. As we moved through the thick jungle, the drivers ( I wish that I could recall the lead driver’s name!) did a superb job. Other units including elements of the 2d Battalion of the 34th Armor and the 2d Battalion of the 12th Infantry (leg infantry) were also moving toward Gold to reinforce. Given the speed of our movement literally “over” the trees and jungle and our unfamiliarity of the situation at Gold my platoon was detached from Charlie and I again had direct radio contact with our battalion CO, LTC Ralph Julian. Julian was in a bubble top helicopter at tree top level drawing fire and directing our column through the jungle into Soui Tre. Along the way we encountered tanks of the 2d/34th Armor that had been moving to the battle but had thrown tracks and couldn’t effectively move through the jungle. Recon followed by Charlie passed them by but they joined in behind us through the paths we had cleared. Our tracks broke enough jungle for the tanks to join further back in the column. I recall crossing no major water obstacle but then again my focus was on getting to Soui Tre in a hurry.[4] As we moved I began to get and passed on updates on the battle at FSB Gold that finally included reports of several breaches of the perimeter and hand to hand fighting within. The Artillery had lowered their guns to fire directly into the enemy waves. One round had to be fired to destroy one of their own "quad 50's" that the VC had overrun and were attempting to turn against the Americans. My drivers broke through thick jungle and overcame obstacles with ever increasing determination as they heard the reports. During the movement, due to the superb skills of the drivers and the sergeants directing them we did not throw a single track on any of the M113's - a relatively easy mishap in M113 maneuvers through the jungle
Eventually we broke through into a large open area at Soui Tre and I could see the smoke ahead from the battle centered to our northeast about 600 meters to our front. At this point I asked LTC Julian for guidance as to how to deploy most effectively . He said that he was not certain of the immediate need and that I should contact the commanders on the ground at the firebase. As our tracks broke into the clearing and moved toward the firebase and after I had spoken to Julian I recall seeing bodies on the ground in front of our tracks. Impulsively I had the thought to call the platoon and warn them to be careful and not run anyone over (too many days as a safety officer in the States I guess). Almost as instantaneously, and fortunately before I gave the command, it hit me that the prone figures in the open grass were the enemy and they were shooting at us. My perception was that the events began to move more slowly but in reality things were happening very quickly from that point on.
Our movement to the FSB once we had broken out into the clearing was direct and in a single column, Recon, Charlie Co., 2/34 Armor. I brought the lead track right to the edge of the 3d/22nd perimeter and they angled out facing the attack. The defensive position was smoldering. It gave an appearance of having been flattened and what had been, I am sure, a circular defensive position was clearly broken at several points. I was in the third track and as my track came to the edge of the defensive perimeter I could see and immediately recognized two LTC’s moving toward me on the ground in front of me with smiles from ear to ear.[5] I had jumped up to the top of the track in case I had needed to get on the ground to coordinate. Their smiles and proximity kept me on top of the track, a location that, in retrospect, was, at the least, ill-advised. There were an awful lot of bullets whizzing past. I yelled down “Which way should we go?” “”Anyway you want!” came the replies through the smiles. At this point I got on the radio and looked back behind me. Stretching all the way back into the jungle break out point was an awesome single file of M113's and tanks. The sound of the engines almost seemed to overcome the battle sounds. It must have been a truly frightening site and sound to the enemy. At that point I wish that I had thought to say something significant; possibly a “Sound the charge!” or a “YOOOO!” reminiscent of a John Wayne movie sound bite or a “Follow me!” of Fort Benning origin. “Move out. Circle the perimeter” with an arm wave was, however, what came out. I recall then LTC Vessey quoted in the news about our arrival saying the event was just like the cavalry charge to the rescue of the wagon train from a John Wayne movie.
The move around the perimeter was eventful. VC at times prone on the ground began running, many toward and some away from us. Some tried to climb onto our tracks as we moved between the firebase and the main VC attack. The 50 caliber machine guns tore into the VC unit but pistols and M-16s kept the VC off the tracks. Sgt Casablanca, my platoon sergeant had been manning one of the turret 50s. His 50 malfunctioned as we arrived and he ended up expending several hundred rounds by hand pumping each individual round into the chamber - an extraordinary physical effort. When the battle ended there were VC bodies every few feet. The total official body count of VC was 647. I understand that this was the single largest enemy body count of the war. Bulldozers were lifted in and the bodies dumped into huge mass graves they created. Thirty-one Americans were killed and 187 wounded.
After it had settled, I took my platoon on a dismounted sweep of the battlefield as helicopters brought in supplies and evacuated our dead and wounded. I was called over to one of the VC bodies by one of my men who believed the VC was still alive. The VC was face down prone on the ground with each hand tucked under his chest. We moved the body by pulling the leg with the use of a pack harness thinking it was booby trapped or that he was still armed. As we did this he began to turn around toward us. A couple of men jumped on him and after a brief struggle, and no unnecessary harm to him, we secured him. I found out later that he was an officer who provided good intelligence.
During the heat of the 3d/22d’s battle, the Air Force and Army artillery had expended a lot of ordnance against the VC attack. The Air Force missions had been directed from a small single-engine prop aircraft by an Air Force fighter pilot serving as a forward air controller (FAC) while another piloted the aircraft. I had known the FAC very well from our time in Ft. Lewis prior to deployment. About a month prior he had swooped down over my position out in the jungle and dropped me a pair of Air Force pilot gloves that I still have. When he was killed he had three more days before he was to leave his FAC responsibilities and go back to flying fighters in-country. Their plane had been shot down during the battle and after things had settled down at the FSB a chopper pilot flying over saw movement at the crash site some distance from the firebase. We believed that the bulk of the withdrawing VC force, the better part of a division, had retreated into or through this area.
LTC Julian ordered my platoon to move rapidly to the location to see if it had been survivors or VC that had been seen at the site. As we approached the crash site we drew fire from our front and flank and then at the site. A platoon from Bravo 2d/22nd was moved into position to reinforce (or save us) if necessary. I ended up not calling them forward and secured the site. We recovered the bodies of both pilots from the wreckage and brought them back. Soon after we had extracted them (given the enemy contact and threat, we all moved very quickly) the aircraft exploded sending me flying about 20 feet. Our movements, I assume, might have put some still hot electrical wires in contact with the gasoline. Of course in-coming fire might have triggered the explosion but we didn’t stick around to investigate.
Well that’s about it. I understand that the battlefield is now under Suoi Tre Lake with the recent damming of a river. Regrettably, I haven’t sat down with another FSB Gold veteran in a very long time. These are old memories now and others can fill in a different perspective or recollection or maybe refresh mine. On that day as on each day of my time in Vietnam I was most privileged to command and serve with the finest men I will ever know. God bless them.
Nine months later on the night of January 1 - 2, 1968 , the Triple Deuce again with the 3d/22 Infantry, and the 2d/77Artillery were involved in a second massive attack by four battalions of NVA and VC at a place called Soui Cut. Soui Cut was just another dot on the map some 8 or 9 klicks northeast of Soui Tre. It was called Fire Support Base Burt in Vietnam. This time Triple Deuce was securing part of the perimeter. When the firing stopped the next morning, over 401 NVA and VC were dead on the battlefield with American losses at 23 killed and 153 wounded. I understand that one of the participants later wrote a screen play and produced the movie "Platoon" loosely presenting the Soui Cut battle as the culminating encounter in the movie.
[1] I certainly do not mean to diminish its contributions and accomplishments right up to the present day. I just don’t know what actions it has engaged in since that date.
[2] In the spirit of full disclosure, I commanded Charlie company for the six months following White. “Chargin Chuck” was an awesome fighting machine. Let me add now that the men, enlisted and non-commissioned infantry, medics, mechanics, drivers and mortars in our whole battalion, in the line companies, Recon and headquarters company were individually and collectively outstanding. Officer leadership varied.
[3] While we had operated as a separate maneuver unit I had direct radio with the battalion commander. Attached to Charlie I had to drop that line to operate on the Charlie Company net - another “insult”.
[4] In subsequent press reports COL Garth, the Brigade CO, was quoted as saying that he had directed that we turn tracks over in the river and cross over them if necessary to breach the river obstacle. Some of the recent accounts suggest that the incident happened, though possibly with some other unit. While I commanded the lead unit I was never given such a directive nor was such a directive, in my memory, ever brought up or discussed in the aftermath of the battle among the participants. During our movement to and entry into Gold, LTC Julian in his bubble top was the only unit commander I saw flying below a 2-3 thousand foot altitude and drawing fire. He flew at tree top level.
[5] One of these LTC’s was the artillery battalion commander at Gold named Vessey. He later in his career became the Chief of Staff of the Army.
For further information try http://www.22ndinfantry.org/vietnam.htm. There are a number of other websites of units who were part of these battles that are worth looking at. As examples: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,941071,00.html http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/Vietnam/90-7/ch13.htm
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The original note was posted on 5/12/07. This is just a brief update to my original note. Recently, I met with LTC Julian (now Col [ret.]) for the first time since 1967 and we spoke about the Soui Tre battle. He informed me that subsequent to my platoon's extraction of the Air Force pilots, another of our units had swept through the area. They found that my platoon, on our way to recover the pilots, had actually driven over and close to a half a dozen buried artillery rounds that had been wired by the VC to command detonate. Apparently the VC had planned their escape route expecting our mechanized unit to chase them and laid the IED's for us. We didn't use the IED term back then although the VC consistently and effectively used "improvised" claymores in the trees and booby traps in the defense of their jungle base camps and buried artillery rounds in the roadways and expected travel routes. The speed of our movement and the effectiveness of our return fire, somehow, kept them from setting off the explosives following Soui Tre.
Grappa, July 31, 2009.
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