Thoughts on "A Failure in Generalship"

Lt. Col. Paul Yingling has written an excellent article addressing the systemic failures of general officer leadership in Iraq. It can be found at:

www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198.

I have not served in Iraq but I have tried to study the growing library. Contemporary press accounts during the immediate aftermath of the seizure of Baghdad along with the subsequent reviews contained in publications such as "Cobra II" by Gordon and Trainor and "Fiasco" by Ricks made it clear that there was a striking deficiency in the performance of a number of general officers from Gen. Franks on down the general officer command as well as in the Pentagon.

There is validity in Yingling's position that the problems are systemic. His critique of the "political" nature of the path to general rank is nothing new however. More pointedly he contends that "America's generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy." The only exception he points to on the issue of the substantive advice given to civilian authorities is Gen. Shinseki, who while the Chief of Staff of the Army had told Congress that substantially more forces than the administration proposed would be needed in Iraq to stabilize the country. Yingling's admonition may need to be restated in this day and age but, again, it is nothing new. In his first meeting with the Army Staff, Gen. Mathew B. Ridgway, Chief of Staff of the Army in 1953-55, said:
"The point I wish to make here, and to repeat it for emphasis, is that the professional military man has three primary responsibilities:
"First, to give his honest, fearless, objective, professional military opinion of what he needs to do the job the Nation gives him.
"Second, if what is given is less than the minimum he regards as essential, to give his superiors an honest, fearless, objective opinion of the consequences.
"Third, and finally, he has the duty whatever the final decision, to do the utmost with whatever is furnished."
The general officers responsible for Iraq failed in their responsibilities in consideration of the first two points. The third point is particularly relevant in consideration of the efforts now of Gen. Patraeus

Yingling accuses the general officers of failing to prepare the armed forces for the conflict in Iraq. He says that "The most tragic error a general can make is to assume without much reflection that wars of the future will look much like wars of the past." Over the last three years I conducted a non-scientific, anecdotal survey of West Pointers who had graduated in the 1980's and 1990's. Not one remembered any significant study of counterinsurgency during their four years of military instruction. West Point apparently continued to teach Caesar and Napoleon but dismissed the lessons of counterinsurgency. Significantly, it seems that Gen. Petraeus has been recognized as an "expert" in counterinsurgency because of his exceptional, personal effort to study the subject in preparation of his graduate thesis. Any in-service training Patraeus received apparently added little to his credential. I have no doubt that through the past four years, Vietnam combat veterans have read the reports from Iraq and were incredulous at the failure to recognize the signs of insurgency and, more tragically, to apply the lessons learned from Vietnam and earlier insurgency conflicts. I know that I was.

I take issue with Yingling's contention that the Army did not prepare us for counterinsurgency warfare in Vietnam. I thought that we, as junior officers, were well prepared to fight a counterinsurgency. I know the Special Forces were well prepared. The CIA counterinsurgency effort learned and grew rapidly. In my own experience, through four years at West Point from 1961 on, counterinsurgency was the primary focus of our military training. Many of our instructors, including then Major Schwarzkopf, had already served in counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam. I recall lectures by British and French officers with experience in Indochina, Algeria and Malaya. I sat with Bernard Fall and other cadets and talked for hours. We studied the old insurgencies. We played the right war games. Gen. Westmoreland was the Superintendent then at West Point. He fashioned and focused the training and education on counterinsurgency. Gen. Yarborough in command of the special operations forces certainly knew and prepared for the right type of war.

LTC Yingling also seems to forget the enemy troop formations that came down the Laotian and Cambodian trails in regimental size units. The enemy had escalated to the next step in classic insurgency and we met them on those terms on the battle field. That part of the war had to be fought along side the civilian/classic counterinsurgency effort. And we did not lose the Vietnam War militarily on the battlefield we lost it in our own hearts and minds.