According to an Associated Press report of July 15, 2007 as presented on Military.com: "BALAD AIR BASE, Iraq - Away from the headlines and debate over the 'surge' in U.S. ground troops, the Air Force has quietly built up its hardware inside Iraq, sharply stepped up bombing and laid a foundation for a sustained air campaign in support of American and Iraqi forces."
This raises a few questions.
1. Is the buildup part of a contingency for operations against Iran?
2. Is the buildup part of a strategic alternative for operations in Iraq necessitated by insufficient ground forces as is apparently the circumstance in Afghanistan?
3. If such a strategic alternative, how is it reconciled with the counter-insurgency imperatives of the Petraeus approach?
4. As stated by U.S. Air Force officers in the A.P. report, the Air Force expects to stay in Iraq to support Iraqi forces after any withdrawal of U.S. forces. If so, we can expect such U.S. installations to be protected by U.S. ground forces in the manner of DaNang Air Base, Vietnam 1965. Will the level of forces required for active installation security, support of Air Force operations, border interdiction, counter al-Qaeda initiatives, advisor support and training for Iraqi units, at a minimum, allow for any significant reduction of U.S. ground forces within the next five years?
5. With U.S. forces then removed from the primary responsibility of suppressing sectarian violence into these "limited" roles, will there be a significant reduction in U.S. casualties?
My view: 1. Yes. 2. Yes. 3. It cannot be reconciled. 4. No. 5. No.
1 comment:
Interesting to know.
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