U.S. Air Force Buildup in Iraq

According to an Associated Press report of July 15, 2007 as presented on Military.com: "BALAD AIR BASE, Iraq - Away from the headlines and debate over the 'surge' in U.S. ground troops, the Air Force has quietly built up its hardware inside Iraq, sharply stepped up bombing and laid a foundation for a sustained air campaign in support of American and Iraqi forces."

This raises a few questions.
1. Is the buildup part of a contingency for operations against Iran?
2. Is the buildup part of a strategic alternative for operations in Iraq necessitated by insufficient ground forces as is apparently the circumstance in Afghanistan?
3. If such a strategic alternative, how is it reconciled with the counter-insurgency imperatives of the Petraeus approach?
4. As stated by U.S. Air Force officers in the A.P. report, the Air Force expects to stay in Iraq to support Iraqi forces after any withdrawal of U.S. forces. If so, we can expect such U.S. installations to be protected by U.S. ground forces in the manner of DaNang Air Base, Vietnam 1965. Will the level of forces required for active installation security, support of Air Force operations, border interdiction, counter al-Qaeda initiatives, advisor support and training for Iraqi units, at a minimum, allow for any significant reduction of U.S. ground forces within the next five years?
5. With U.S. forces then removed from the primary responsibility of suppressing sectarian violence into these "limited" roles, will there be a significant reduction in U.S. casualties?

My view: 1. Yes. 2. Yes. 3. It cannot be reconciled. 4. No. 5. No.

Defund State

The United States Senate has begun again to debate the Iraq debacle. The preliminary speeches and sound bites have focused on our continuing military commitment. The President asks that we wait for the September assessment by General Patraeus. His opposition demands immediate planning for troop withdrawals. There had been talk about the congressional exercise of its control of funding to force a military closure. Our men and women in uniform are performing heroically and successfully. The generals now commanding them and commanding media attention are rightly driven by a sense of duty to accomplish the assigned mission. The tragedy within Iraq is not of their doing nor within their capability to correct. To focus on the military is to walk head long into the tree in a pine forest.

All emphasis should now be focused on forcing this President to implement recommendations of the Baker/Hamilton Report and begin immediately a strategic political initiative. This initiative must be open and direct, drawing in all concerned nations. This initiative must acknowledge the willingness of the United States to accept a reasoned and equitable resolution. If only implicitly, this President must acknowledge his administration's inability to command the respect of the other nations in reaching a diplomatic resolution and work to assemble a coalition of nations. The world is aware of the political climate within this country and would recognize the voice of our Congress as an assertion of the long-term will of the Nation. Congress is, frankly, out of its league in directing military matters but, if it can put aside partisan politics, it can speak forcefully both to this President and to the world.

Should the President fail to immediately act to begin such a strategic approach Congress might consider cutting funding for the Department of State. It is clear that the President, during the reign of Rumsfeld, had little if any use for the State Department. It is also clear now that the Department has no functional responsibility regarding this country's single most important international crisis. If Congress shuns the real issue and needs a plaything let it be State and not Defense.