In The News

In the news today: "Fire in Executive Office Building near Cheney's "ceremonial" office."

In the news tomorrow: "Cheney claims subpoenaed documents destroyed in fire."

OR

In the news tomorrow: "Cheney staffer admits fire started following weekly ceremonial burning of US Constitution."

The Reality of the Petraeous Report

I consider the exchange between General Petraeous and Senator John Warner (R. VA) to be significant in understanding the perspective of General Petraeous and essential to weighing its value in the debate of our country's "strategy" toward Iraq. Senator Warner asked the General if he were able to say whether the strategy as he had laid it out would make America safer. The General initially responded that he believed the strategy was the best course to reach our objectives in Iraq to accomplish the mission of the multi-national force Iraq. Pressed again by Warner, Petraeous explained that he had tried to focus on what commanders are supposed to do. Petraeous concluded that his strategy was "the best recommendation to achieve the objectives of the policy from which the objectives are derived." His approach then was merely to accept the finality of the existing force structure and the administration's woefully inadequate "strategy." Acceptance of the General's recommendations then is to agree to nothing more than a face-lift to the "stay the course" road to debacle of President Bush.

It is appropriate to reexamine the comments of Gen. Mathew B. Ridgway, Chief of Staff of the Army in 1953-55. "The point I wish to make here, and to repeat it for emphasis, is that the professional military man has three primary responsibilities:"First, to give his honest, fearless, objective, professional military opinion of what he needs to do the job the Nation gives him."Second, if what is given is less than the minimum he regards as essential, to give his superiors an honest, fearless, objective opinion of the consequences."Third, and finally, he has the duty whatever the final decision, to do the utmost with whatever is furnished." Regrettably, General Petraeous approached his task only as to how "to do the utmost with whatever is furnished." We were wrong to expect more from a soldier.

U.S. Air Force Buildup in Iraq

According to an Associated Press report of July 15, 2007 as presented on Military.com: "BALAD AIR BASE, Iraq - Away from the headlines and debate over the 'surge' in U.S. ground troops, the Air Force has quietly built up its hardware inside Iraq, sharply stepped up bombing and laid a foundation for a sustained air campaign in support of American and Iraqi forces."

This raises a few questions.
1. Is the buildup part of a contingency for operations against Iran?
2. Is the buildup part of a strategic alternative for operations in Iraq necessitated by insufficient ground forces as is apparently the circumstance in Afghanistan?
3. If such a strategic alternative, how is it reconciled with the counter-insurgency imperatives of the Petraeus approach?
4. As stated by U.S. Air Force officers in the A.P. report, the Air Force expects to stay in Iraq to support Iraqi forces after any withdrawal of U.S. forces. If so, we can expect such U.S. installations to be protected by U.S. ground forces in the manner of DaNang Air Base, Vietnam 1965. Will the level of forces required for active installation security, support of Air Force operations, border interdiction, counter al-Qaeda initiatives, advisor support and training for Iraqi units, at a minimum, allow for any significant reduction of U.S. ground forces within the next five years?
5. With U.S. forces then removed from the primary responsibility of suppressing sectarian violence into these "limited" roles, will there be a significant reduction in U.S. casualties?

My view: 1. Yes. 2. Yes. 3. It cannot be reconciled. 4. No. 5. No.

Defund State

The United States Senate has begun again to debate the Iraq debacle. The preliminary speeches and sound bites have focused on our continuing military commitment. The President asks that we wait for the September assessment by General Patraeus. His opposition demands immediate planning for troop withdrawals. There had been talk about the congressional exercise of its control of funding to force a military closure. Our men and women in uniform are performing heroically and successfully. The generals now commanding them and commanding media attention are rightly driven by a sense of duty to accomplish the assigned mission. The tragedy within Iraq is not of their doing nor within their capability to correct. To focus on the military is to walk head long into the tree in a pine forest.

All emphasis should now be focused on forcing this President to implement recommendations of the Baker/Hamilton Report and begin immediately a strategic political initiative. This initiative must be open and direct, drawing in all concerned nations. This initiative must acknowledge the willingness of the United States to accept a reasoned and equitable resolution. If only implicitly, this President must acknowledge his administration's inability to command the respect of the other nations in reaching a diplomatic resolution and work to assemble a coalition of nations. The world is aware of the political climate within this country and would recognize the voice of our Congress as an assertion of the long-term will of the Nation. Congress is, frankly, out of its league in directing military matters but, if it can put aside partisan politics, it can speak forcefully both to this President and to the world.

Should the President fail to immediately act to begin such a strategic approach Congress might consider cutting funding for the Department of State. It is clear that the President, during the reign of Rumsfeld, had little if any use for the State Department. It is also clear now that the Department has no functional responsibility regarding this country's single most important international crisis. If Congress shuns the real issue and needs a plaything let it be State and not Defense.

London Car Bombs

Television news networks by the rhetoric, which cannot be considered "reporting," describing in the most lurid terms editorial views of the potential damage the car bombs might have inflicted, do nothing more than incite the same fear and anxiety that the terrorists failed to accomplish. Ratings must give way to responsible journalism.

Accountability

Maybe, just maybe Congress will follow through with its responsibility to support and defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/27/AR2007062701325.html?hpid=topnews

Too Much Mr. Cheney

It has been my preference to use this blog for publishing essays presenting my personal views on somewhat random topics. Clearly, major events in our world have prompted my thought and writing. So far I have taken time to compose the essays. I have refrained from a continuing commentary here although expressing my views in almost daily emails to select friends. However, I now need a more therapeutic release; "they" are creating too much, too fast. I do not expect to spend any real time composing and editing. I am writing for my own edification and relief. I expect to react from my unconscious, immediate sense - my "gut," the "Blink" or "thin-slicing" described by Gladwell in his book.

The proverbial straw: The Vice President as a "Fourth Branch" of our government. Mr. Cheney apparently is claiming now an exemption from an Executive Order of the President directed to the Executive Branch. See:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/21/AR2007062102309.html

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/21/AR2007062101663.html

I'll reserve placing this Cheney action into a broader context of his accomplishments for a later date. Suffice, in this now-revised blog, to say that his position is arrogant and wrong. I understand that the Office of the Vice President does straddle the Executive and Legislative Branches. The Vice President holds the Constitutional position of President of the Senate. However, this title remains what the drafters intended: a "tie-breaking" position of no further responsibility. I accept that early in our Nations development the exact nature of the office of Vice President was unsettled. I believe that throughout our history Presidents have assigned varying responsibilities to the occupants of the position. The evolution of the responsibilities of the Office have unquestionably resulted now and in recent history in the Vice President's de-facto position within the Executive Branch of our government. At various times, Vice Presidents who rose from the Legislative Branch have tried to retain elements of control and influence in Congress. Invariably those were rebuffed by the legislators

Vice President Cheney, by statute, is a Member of the President's National Security Council. Even a cursory glance at the composition and responsibilities of this body place it beyond cavil in the Executive Branch. The same must be said about the Vice President's position as a member of the President's Cabinet. Although I have not been privileged to personally view the level of Mr. Cheney's involvement, I have a strong suspicion that it has been substantial. http://blog.washingtonpost.com/cheney/ Mr. Cheney has in the recent past invoked in public forums, in response to Congress and in the Federal Courts, the privileges of the Executive Branch when it has suited his purposes. Throw in his office address and place of honor on the White House web site and the unbridled arrogance of this man is manifest.

This is not a man asserting a reasonable interpretation of ambiguous law. His prior actions belie that view.

Another General Speaks

I heard it up close and personal forty-five years ago. We could have used his strengths these past five years. Perhaps even his perceived weakness, his ego, would have been an effective counter force in pursuit of sound military strategy against incompetent civilian planning.

In this speech Gen. MacArthur continues to speak to the professional military officer. The conduct of the general officer ranks of the United States military in recent years can be judged against this code of Duty, Honor and Country. All Americans need to try to understand this ethic to help put into proper context the perspectives of the professional military man and woman. It is not the complete answer but it is an excellent introductory lecture.

http://www.aogusma.org/PUBS/Register/MacA.htm

What Are They Saying, Mr. President?

"In today's Afghanistan, people are free to speak their minds...."
Remarks by the President on the Global War on Terror to the American Enterprise Institute, February 15, 2007.

The New York Times website today published a front page report on the United States/NATO effort in Afghanistan. "Civilian Deaths Undermine War on Taliban" By Carlotta Gall and David E. Sanger. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/13/world/asia/13AFGHAN.html?hp There are many issues that are raised in this article but for now only one has pushed my button.

The report begins "Scores of civilian deaths over the past months from heavy American and allied reliance on airstrikes to battle Taliban insurgents are threatening popular support for the Afghan government and creating severe strains within the NATO alliance." American and NATO military sources as reported in the article contend that the airstrikes are necessary because there are not enough ground forces. The article quotes a senior NATO official as saying "without air, we'd need hundreds of thousands of troops" in Afghanistan.

The President in his speech to the AEI in February (see below) spoke proudly that "Just two weeks ago, NATO launched an air strike against Taliban fighters who had seized the town of Musa Qala in Helmand province--a key Taliban commander was brought to justice. " Todays report in the Times points to "reports [having] surfaced of at least 21 civilians killed in an airstrike in Helmand Province, though residents reached by phone said the toll could be as high as 80."

Gen Patraeus in Iraq is exercising counter-insurgency dogma that purposefully attempts to avoid the use of air and artillery that could cause unnecessary civilian casualties. The well-founded rationale is intended to avoid the precise reaction from the indigenous population that we are apparently causing in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a war that America and most of the world agreed had legitimately targeted Bin Laden, his al Qaeda band and the Taliban that gave them refuge. United States forces were given a mission that had a high probability of success if adequate military resources had been committed to the effort. President Bush, encouraged by his neo's, pulled the plug on war against a real and now growing threat. President Bush allowed Bin Laden to live on.

I doubt that NATO will substantially add to the forces now in Afghanistan in large measure because of the lack of leadership from our government. Bush, by his continuous exercise of gross judgement in and about Iraq and the wrongly named "war" on terror, has abdicated a leadership role in the conduct of world affairs. To be sure, NATO countries should see the need to crush the Taliban as their own national priority. The United States had led NATO for decades, primarily by example and credible, persuasive leadership from the White House. No NATO country has the credibility or leadership necessary to respond to the force demands now in Afghanistan. They must be looking over their shoulder at England to see what happened to a follower of Bush's policies.

No matter how critical the needs in Afghanistan Bush does not have the political credibility in the United States to be able to correct his error and reinforce the troops in Afghanistan. We lack the forces to maintain adequate ground force levels in both countries. American lives will continue to be lost in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has taken Bush and our military command almost four years to bring about a reasoned, credible strategy in Iraq. It appears that they need more time to apply one in Afghanistan. And that is part of the continuing tragedy of his Presidency.

A brief discussion of "hearts and minds" in Afghanistan: http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9164957

A view of Afghanistan as only President Bush can articulate in one of the few remaining venues receptive to his perspectives:
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25630,filter.all/pub_detail.asp

Recollections of the Battle of Soui Tre, Vietnam on March 21, 1967

"One of the war's greatest victories." VFW Magazine.

I had been the Recon platoon leader in the 2nd Battalion, 22d Infantry (Mechanized), a.k.a. "Triple Deuce"(radio call sign: “Fullback”), for a couple of months prior to March 21st, 1967. The following recollections are sketchy in part but also with specific, very vivid memories interspersed. The battalion was operating as part of Operation Junction City and Fire Support Base Gold was established at a hot LZ near Soui Tre (a dot on the map only). The full 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry secured the perimeter at Gold for the 2d Battalion of the 77th Artillery (DS). Prior to March 21st our battalion had been involved in S&D (Search & Destroy) operations in assigned areas mainly to the west of Soui Tre.

On the night of the 20th of March, my battalion commander, LTC Ralph Julian, assigned Charlie company, commanded by Cpt George C. White, an area of operations with alert notice of possible need to reinforce FSB Gold. My Recon platoon was attached to Charlie company for more fire power. Charlie company had been and continued, through at least January 1968 when it fought decisively at FSB Burt (Soui Cut - another dot on the map)[1], to be the most aggressive and competent of the line companies.[2] I was not happy with the attachment of my platoon to a line company, even Charlie company. Recon had operated continuously and successfully as a separate maneuver unit. The men in the platoon firmly told me of their dissatisfaction with the attachment that night as well. Insult seemed to be heaped onto insult when White directed me to bring the Recon platoon up the rear of his company. My platoon had been having sustained VC contact prior to the 20th of March and possibly White wanted to give us a break. Whatever the reason, it did not sit very well with me though I did not say anything to White whom I greatly respected. Recon had always been out front and in the thick of it and as it turned out on March 21st the “insults” would put us right back at the front and in the heat of battle.

Charlie moved out and we pulled in behind. We had not moved for very long when George White called me[3] and advised that he had been ordered to immediately move to reinforce the units at FSB Gold. He directed us to turn the individual tracks in-place and Recon was to be the lead unit in Fullback’s reinforcement effort. I have to say that there was, in fact, a small smile on my face and shouts on the platoon radio of “Yes!” and “Let’s get em!”. When it came to moving the M113 tracks, Recon drivers were outstanding and we spun and began to move. Soon after we had all turned 180 degrees and I had moved to the new front of the column as the third track we started off. Looking off to my left I saw an RPG round in the air heading toward us but striking a large termite hill about 30 yards from our line. I doubt that any one else saw it due to our positions. There was no other VC contact so I chose not to engage the enemy there given the immediacy of our need to get to FSB Gold. At the time I considered it a deliberate effort to engage and stall all or some of us. As we moved through the thick jungle, the drivers ( I wish that I could recall the lead driver’s name!) did a superb job. Other units including elements of the 2d Battalion of the 34th Armor and the 2d Battalion of the 12th Infantry (leg infantry) were also moving toward Gold to reinforce. Given the speed of our movement literally “over” the trees and jungle and our unfamiliarity of the situation at Gold my platoon was detached from Charlie and I again had direct radio contact with our battalion CO, LTC Ralph Julian. Julian was in a bubble top helicopter at tree top level drawing fire and directing our column through the jungle into Soui Tre. Along the way we encountered tanks of the 2d/34th Armor that had been moving to the battle but had thrown tracks and couldn’t effectively move through the jungle. Recon followed by Charlie passed them by but they joined in behind us through the paths we had cleared. Our tracks broke enough jungle for the tanks to join further back in the column. I recall crossing no major water obstacle but then again my focus was on getting to Soui Tre in a hurry.[4] As we moved I began to get and passed on updates on the battle at FSB Gold that finally included reports of several breaches of the perimeter and hand to hand fighting within. The Artillery had lowered their guns to fire directly into the enemy waves. One round had to be fired to destroy one of their own "quad 50's" that the VC had overrun and were attempting to turn against the Americans. My drivers broke through thick jungle and overcame obstacles with ever increasing determination as they heard the reports. During the movement, due to the superb skills of the drivers and the sergeants directing them we did not throw a single track on any of the M113's - a relatively easy mishap in M113 maneuvers through the jungle

Eventually we broke through into a large open area at Soui Tre and I could see the smoke ahead from the battle centered to our northeast about 600 meters to our front. At this point I asked LTC Julian for guidance as to how to deploy most effectively . He said that he was not certain of the immediate need and that I should contact the commanders on the ground at the firebase. As our tracks broke into the clearing and moved toward the firebase and after I had spoken to Julian I recall seeing bodies on the ground in front of our tracks. Impulsively I had the thought to call the platoon and warn them to be careful and not run anyone over (too many days as a safety officer in the States I guess). Almost as instantaneously, and fortunately before I gave the command, it hit me that the prone figures in the open grass were the enemy and they were shooting at us. My perception was that the events began to move more slowly but in reality things were happening very quickly from that point on.

Our movement to the FSB once we had broken out into the clearing was direct and in a single column, Recon, Charlie Co., 2/34 Armor. I brought the lead track right to the edge of the 3d/22nd perimeter and they angled out facing the attack. The defensive position was smoldering. It gave an appearance of having been flattened and what had been, I am sure, a circular defensive position was clearly broken at several points. I was in the third track and as my track came to the edge of the defensive perimeter I could see and immediately recognized two LTC’s moving toward me on the ground in front of me with smiles from ear to ear.[5] I had jumped up to the top of the track in case I had needed to get on the ground to coordinate. Their smiles and proximity kept me on top of the track, a location that, in retrospect, was, at the least, ill-advised. There were an awful lot of bullets whizzing past. I yelled down “Which way should we go?” “”Anyway you want!” came the replies through the smiles. At this point I got on the radio and looked back behind me. Stretching all the way back into the jungle break out point was an awesome single file of M113's and tanks. The sound of the engines almost seemed to overcome the battle sounds. It must have been a truly frightening site and sound to the enemy. At that point I wish that I had thought to say something significant; possibly a “Sound the charge!” or a “YOOOO!” reminiscent of a John Wayne movie sound bite or a “Follow me!” of Fort Benning origin. “Move out. Circle the perimeter” with an arm wave was, however, what came out. I recall then LTC Vessey quoted in the news about our arrival saying the event was just like the cavalry charge to the rescue of the wagon train from a John Wayne movie.

The move around the perimeter was eventful. VC at times prone on the ground began running, many toward and some away from us. Some tried to climb onto our tracks as we moved between the firebase and the main VC attack. The 50 caliber machine guns tore into the VC unit but pistols and M-16s kept the VC off the tracks. Sgt Casablanca, my platoon sergeant had been manning one of the turret 50s. His 50 malfunctioned as we arrived and he ended up expending several hundred rounds by hand pumping each individual round into the chamber - an extraordinary physical effort. When the battle ended there were VC bodies every few feet. The total official body count of VC was 647. I understand that this was the single largest enemy body count of the war. Bulldozers were lifted in and the bodies dumped into huge mass graves they created. Thirty-one Americans were killed and 187 wounded.

After it had settled, I took my platoon on a dismounted sweep of the battlefield as helicopters brought in supplies and evacuated our dead and wounded. I was called over to one of the VC bodies by one of my men who believed the VC was still alive. The VC was face down prone on the ground with each hand tucked under his chest. We moved the body by pulling the leg with the use of a pack harness thinking it was booby trapped or that he was still armed. As we did this he began to turn around toward us. A couple of men jumped on him and after a brief struggle, and no unnecessary harm to him, we secured him. I found out later that he was an officer who provided good intelligence.

During the heat of the 3d/22d’s battle, the Air Force and Army artillery had expended a lot of ordnance against the VC attack. The Air Force missions had been directed from a small single-engine prop aircraft by an Air Force fighter pilot serving as a forward air controller (FAC) while another piloted the aircraft. I had known the FAC very well from our time in Ft. Lewis prior to deployment. About a month prior he had swooped down over my position out in the jungle and dropped me a pair of Air Force pilot gloves that I still have. When he was killed he had three more days before he was to leave his FAC responsibilities and go back to flying fighters in-country. Their plane had been shot down during the battle and after things had settled down at the FSB a chopper pilot flying over saw movement at the crash site some distance from the firebase. We believed that the bulk of the withdrawing VC force, the better part of a division, had retreated into or through this area.

LTC Julian ordered my platoon to move rapidly to the location to see if it had been survivors or VC that had been seen at the site. As we approached the crash site we drew fire from our front and flank and then at the site. A platoon from Bravo 2d/22nd was moved into position to reinforce (or save us) if necessary. I ended up not calling them forward and secured the site. We recovered the bodies of both pilots from the wreckage and brought them back. Soon after we had extracted them (given the enemy contact and threat, we all moved very quickly) the aircraft exploded sending me flying about 20 feet. Our movements, I assume, might have put some still hot electrical wires in contact with the gasoline. Of course in-coming fire might have triggered the explosion but we didn’t stick around to investigate.

Well that’s about it. I understand that the battlefield is now under Suoi Tre Lake with the recent damming of a river. Regrettably, I haven’t sat down with another FSB Gold veteran in a very long time. These are old memories now and others can fill in a different perspective or recollection or maybe refresh mine. On that day as on each day of my time in Vietnam I was most privileged to command and serve with the finest men I will ever know. God bless them.

Nine months later on the night of January 1 - 2, 1968 , the Triple Deuce again with the 3d/22 Infantry, and the 2d/77Artillery were involved in a second massive attack by four battalions of NVA and VC at a place called Soui Cut. Soui Cut was just another dot on the map some 8 or 9 klicks northeast of Soui Tre. It was called Fire Support Base Burt in Vietnam. This time Triple Deuce was securing part of the perimeter. When the firing stopped the next morning, over 401 NVA and VC were dead on the battlefield with American losses at 23 killed and 153 wounded. I understand that one of the participants later wrote a screen play and produced the movie "Platoon" loosely presenting the Soui Cut battle as the culminating encounter in the movie.


[1] I certainly do not mean to diminish its contributions and accomplishments right up to the present day. I just don’t know what actions it has engaged in since that date.
[2] In the spirit of full disclosure, I commanded Charlie company for the six months following White. “Chargin Chuck” was an awesome fighting machine. Let me add now that the men, enlisted and non-commissioned infantry, medics, mechanics, drivers and mortars in our whole battalion, in the line companies, Recon and headquarters company were individually and collectively outstanding. Officer leadership varied.
[3] While we had operated as a separate maneuver unit I had direct radio with the battalion commander. Attached to Charlie I had to drop that line to operate on the Charlie Company net - another “insult”.
[4] In subsequent press reports COL Garth, the Brigade CO, was quoted as saying that he had directed that we turn tracks over in the river and cross over them if necessary to breach the river obstacle. Some of the recent accounts suggest that the incident happened, though possibly with some other unit. While I commanded the lead unit I was never given such a directive nor was such a directive, in my memory, ever brought up or discussed in the aftermath of the battle among the participants. During our movement to and entry into Gold, LTC Julian in his bubble top was the only unit commander I saw flying below a 2-3 thousand foot altitude and drawing fire. He flew at tree top level.
[5] One of these LTC’s was the artillery battalion commander at Gold named Vessey. He later in his career became the Chief of Staff of the Army.

For further information try http://www.22ndinfantry.org/vietnam.htm. There are a number of other websites of units who were part of these battles that are worth looking at. As examples: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,941071,00.html http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/Vietnam/90-7/ch13.htm

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
The original note was posted on 5/12/07. This is just a brief update to my original note. Recently, I met with LTC Julian (now Col [ret.]) for the first time since 1967 and we spoke about the Soui Tre battle. He informed me that subsequent to my platoon's extraction of the Air Force pilots, another of our units had swept through the area. They found that my platoon, on our way to recover the pilots, had actually driven over and close to a half a dozen buried artillery rounds that had been wired by the VC to command detonate. Apparently the VC had planned their escape route expecting our mechanized unit to chase them and laid the IED's for us. We didn't use the IED term back then although the VC consistently and effectively used "improvised" claymores in the trees and booby traps in the defense of their jungle base camps and buried artillery rounds in the roadways and expected travel routes. The speed of our movement and the effectiveness of our return fire, somehow, kept them from setting off the explosives following Soui Tre.
Grappa, July 31, 2009.

"Gee, Mr. President, help us keep our jobs."

The front page heading on the New York Times websight reads "GOP Moderates warn Bush Iraq Must Show Gains." http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/washington/10cong.html?hp
"Moderate Republicans gave President Bush a blunt warning on his Iraq policy at a private White House meeting this week, telling the president that conditions needed to improve markedly by fall or more Republicans would desert him on the war."

Now after four years of obvious, escalating, gross negligence in the Bush administration's orchestration of the war in Iraq and the complicity of a neutered military command structure, do "moderate" Republican Congressmen tell the President that "conditions need to improve." Only now, in fear of the personal loss of political power, patronage and notoriety, do these hypocrites confront the President with a call for "improvements." During the Republican control of both houses of Congress they sat back as our efforts in Iraq and in the region were melded into the fiasco we now face. While over three thousand of our finest young women and men were dying, they sat back and repeated the same inane characterizations our President had memorized. They sat back when the Administration used blatantly unfounded fear tactics to win a national election. When the President took illegal actions against American citizens "to defend our American freedoms," they sat back because the Rove/Bush efforts were good for the Party. While the prestige, influence and power of the United States in the world were dangerously diminished, they sat back and memorized Bush's rhetoric; a rhetoric that was at times simply vacuous and at times blatantly and knowingly false. They sat back and never questioned.

These, "our representatives," have not shown themselves to be worthy of the office we have bestowed on them. They deserve no credit for confronting the President to save votes for their Party. When their time comes and they solicit votes in their district or beyond, I sincerely pray that the voters follow their lead and sit back and ignore their set of lies.

I do not suggest by silence that the Democratic Party is without comparable fault, however, I am sure that there will be ample opportunity to address their hypocrisy in the near future.

A Rapper excluded

Well done Australia! The denial of entry to Australia of the rapper Snoop Dog is a statement manifesting a strength of character in the soul of that country. I have long admired those qualities of the Australian character allowing for individual expression and love of life. However, the statements that Australia is making to Snoop Dog individually and to his commercial cohorts are appropriate and commendable. American "rap" has its positive cultural qualities which are, regrettably, almost wholly negated by the commercialization of violent, sexually abusive and criminal elements. The latest twist in rap calls upon citizens not to be "snitches" by assisting the police in the apprehension of criminals no matter what the crime or who the victim. Political, professional and individual cowardice in the United States seems to prevent a media, government and community repudiation of this cultural depravity. The reports of conduct by this particular rapper should, in my opinion, make him undesirable in any community in the United States as well.

Competence in government

First, check out how incompetent the Bush administration has been by failing to utilizing hundreds of millions of dollars in available funds and resources for the recovery after Katrina.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/28/AR2007042801113.html?hpid=topnews

But then, take heart and look at how incompetent the Bush administration is when it does use hundreds of millions of dollars of funds and resources for recovery.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/29/world/middleeast/29reconstruct.html?hp

Thoughts on "A Failure in Generalship"

Lt. Col. Paul Yingling has written an excellent article addressing the systemic failures of general officer leadership in Iraq. It can be found at:

www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198.

I have not served in Iraq but I have tried to study the growing library. Contemporary press accounts during the immediate aftermath of the seizure of Baghdad along with the subsequent reviews contained in publications such as "Cobra II" by Gordon and Trainor and "Fiasco" by Ricks made it clear that there was a striking deficiency in the performance of a number of general officers from Gen. Franks on down the general officer command as well as in the Pentagon.

There is validity in Yingling's position that the problems are systemic. His critique of the "political" nature of the path to general rank is nothing new however. More pointedly he contends that "America's generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy." The only exception he points to on the issue of the substantive advice given to civilian authorities is Gen. Shinseki, who while the Chief of Staff of the Army had told Congress that substantially more forces than the administration proposed would be needed in Iraq to stabilize the country. Yingling's admonition may need to be restated in this day and age but, again, it is nothing new. In his first meeting with the Army Staff, Gen. Mathew B. Ridgway, Chief of Staff of the Army in 1953-55, said:
"The point I wish to make here, and to repeat it for emphasis, is that the professional military man has three primary responsibilities:
"First, to give his honest, fearless, objective, professional military opinion of what he needs to do the job the Nation gives him.
"Second, if what is given is less than the minimum he regards as essential, to give his superiors an honest, fearless, objective opinion of the consequences.
"Third, and finally, he has the duty whatever the final decision, to do the utmost with whatever is furnished."
The general officers responsible for Iraq failed in their responsibilities in consideration of the first two points. The third point is particularly relevant in consideration of the efforts now of Gen. Patraeus

Yingling accuses the general officers of failing to prepare the armed forces for the conflict in Iraq. He says that "The most tragic error a general can make is to assume without much reflection that wars of the future will look much like wars of the past." Over the last three years I conducted a non-scientific, anecdotal survey of West Pointers who had graduated in the 1980's and 1990's. Not one remembered any significant study of counterinsurgency during their four years of military instruction. West Point apparently continued to teach Caesar and Napoleon but dismissed the lessons of counterinsurgency. Significantly, it seems that Gen. Petraeus has been recognized as an "expert" in counterinsurgency because of his exceptional, personal effort to study the subject in preparation of his graduate thesis. Any in-service training Patraeus received apparently added little to his credential. I have no doubt that through the past four years, Vietnam combat veterans have read the reports from Iraq and were incredulous at the failure to recognize the signs of insurgency and, more tragically, to apply the lessons learned from Vietnam and earlier insurgency conflicts. I know that I was.

I take issue with Yingling's contention that the Army did not prepare us for counterinsurgency warfare in Vietnam. I thought that we, as junior officers, were well prepared to fight a counterinsurgency. I know the Special Forces were well prepared. The CIA counterinsurgency effort learned and grew rapidly. In my own experience, through four years at West Point from 1961 on, counterinsurgency was the primary focus of our military training. Many of our instructors, including then Major Schwarzkopf, had already served in counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam. I recall lectures by British and French officers with experience in Indochina, Algeria and Malaya. I sat with Bernard Fall and other cadets and talked for hours. We studied the old insurgencies. We played the right war games. Gen. Westmoreland was the Superintendent then at West Point. He fashioned and focused the training and education on counterinsurgency. Gen. Yarborough in command of the special operations forces certainly knew and prepared for the right type of war.

LTC Yingling also seems to forget the enemy troop formations that came down the Laotian and Cambodian trails in regimental size units. The enemy had escalated to the next step in classic insurgency and we met them on those terms on the battle field. That part of the war had to be fought along side the civilian/classic counterinsurgency effort. And we did not lose the Vietnam War militarily on the battlefield we lost it in our own hearts and minds.

Briefing by Gen Petraeus April 2007

After watching the Pentagon briefing by Gen. Petraeus, I believe the General has presented contentions within two paradigms, one political and one military. The General candidly speaks of the “enormous,” long-term American resources that will be necessary in Iraq. From these assertions it seems clear that he understands that it would be appropriate at this juncture for another political decision by the civilian authority in this country. I believe that he understands that the American people and those in political authority did not anticipate the four year evolution of the war or approve the commitment he believes necessary at this time. By his delineation of needed accomplishments by the Iraqi government as well as his projections of time and manpower requirements of United States forces essential to the stabilization of an Iraqi nation he appears to make clear that a new political consensus should be reached in Washington.

In this regard, it is wholly appropriate, if not mandated, that a discussion in good faith take place between Congress and the President as to our effort within Iraq and as to Iraq in the broader Middle East. Party politics on this issue and legacies be damned when so many lives are at stake.

General Petraeus has also presented a candid, balanced assessment of the strategic and many of the tactical military objectives within Iraq. He presents a view of how, in the context of security provided by the “coalition” and Iraqi forces, the development of Iraqi political control should progress. To be sure, arrogance and incompetence, among other reasons, at the highest levels of civilian and military authority in the United States has delayed the implementation of a reasoned, intelligent, coordinated military/civilian plan. However, Congress gave Gen. Petraeus its approval to begin an attempt to turn the situation around. Thousands of American’s have already invested their lives. Tens of thousands of Iraqi families have lost loved ones. Patraeus has an approach that appears worthy of support both as to its military viability and in the context of the political debate.

As a Vietnam veteran, I recoil at the way that the Vietnam War is twisted by some Democrats to fit a political argument about Iraq. As a formal federal prosecutor, I join the call for a thorough review, through an impeachment proceeding if necessary, of the motives and acts of those in this administration who created this unnecessary war and global turmoil. The bottom line is, however, that we assumed the responsibility for Iraq and must accept responsibility for the collateral consequences as well. We cannot honorably turn our backs and walk away.